Mark Blyth and Wendy Schiller ─ Election 2016: Impact At Home and Abroad

[MUSIC PLAYING] Thank you all for coming. Hello, welcome to the Watson
Institute and Joukowsky Forum. My name is Jeff Salvadore. I’m the Co-president of the
Political Science Department Undergraduate Group along
with Lucrezia Sanes. And yes, we’d just like to
welcome you all here today. We’re very excited
to have a talk by two of Brown’s most
interesting and smartest professors. And yeah, so
without further ado, I’d like to introduce Professor
Wendy Schiller, professor of Political Science
and Public Policy and also the Chair of the
Political Science Department. Her recent publications
include the book Electing the Senate–
Indirect Elections Prior to the 17th Amendment. And Professor Mark Blyth,
the Eastman Professor of Political Economy
and a Professor of Political Science and
International and Public Affairs, who recently just
this summer published a book called Capitalism in Crisis. Did I? It’s just an essay. It has the value
of a book, clearly. But it’s great nonetheless. Exactly. A fun read for your grandma. And we’re very excited
to hear from them today about the state of the
US presidential election and everything that’s
been going on with that. So without further ado, please
join me in welcoming them. OK, welcome, everybody. I think what Mark and
I, Professor Blyth and I decided to do was speak
for about 15 minutes each and then open it up for
questions, particularly since there’s such
a large crowd, we want to make sure that
this is a lively conversation. I’m just setting up a timer. He’s very, very
good at the timer. It’s an unheralded skill,
I think, among academics, so I appreciate it. So I’ll talk about the
domestic situation, and Mark’s going to talk about
the impact of the election globally. So I’d like to
label the election as the election
of our discontent, sort of cribbing from great
novels and great works. And I want to talk a
little bit about what makes this election
different from prior years and what the mechanics of the
election will be going forward. So the election
of our discontent, I would say there’s this sort of
top layer of discontent, which is that not a majority, but a
good 30% to 35% of voters who identify in the Republican
Party or identify in the Democratic
Party are unsatisfied with their nominees. So the party has
nominated Hillary Clinton for the Democratic
side and Donald Trump for the Republican side,
and they’re dissatisfied with their nominees. And that’s a fairly high
level of dissatisfaction when it comes to partisanship. And the second level, there
are really pressing issues in American culture,
and society, and life that have come to the
forefront this year, partly due to independent
events from the election, but also due to the
response or the platforms of the candidates themselves. So we have most recently
the tragic shootings in Oklahoma and in
North Carolina, which follow a string of
tragic shootings in terms of police violence. There is police violence
shooting of individuals, and there’s individuals
shooting of police. And it brings to the fore a
sort of level of discontent not just among those
communities most affected by these tragedies, but a sense
of discontent among Americans that our goals of
things like equality, and reducing discrimination,
and reducing profiling, and reducing these things
that we, as a society, I think, agree upon
as really good goals, we’re just too far away
from achieving those goals. And what’s important about
that discontent, as I said, is it’s not confined to
those who might or might not be directly affected
by these activities, it has spread deeply into
the roots of the country. And in some ways, it remains
confined to the left and right ideological spectrum. But in other ways, it
busts right out of that and really picks up a lot of
people who wouldn’t necessarily agree with other
people on other issues, but agree on these issues. So that’s something that’s
going on in society itself. And it can be
exacerbated, or it can be facilitated by the campaign. I think one would probably
argue that the rhetoric employed by Donald Trump
has, in some ways, exacerbated the situation
in terms of people’s feeling discontent in these areas. But in other areas,
there are another group of people in America. They tend to be mostly working
class manufacturing people. They tend to be
white men and women. They tend to be in the
Southeast and the Midwest. And they feel really let down
by the American capitalist economic system, but
also the political system because they’ve lost their
jobs, or they no longer can have their children
work in the same factory or the same economic
arena close by. Their children have to
leave the community. Anybody from Rhode Island
understands the sentiment that your children might have
to leave Rhode Island to find the best jobs. It’s the same
sentiment pervading a lot of parts of the country. And that has been identified
and sort of encapsulated by Donald Trump when he
talks about trade policy, and NAFTA, the North American
Free Trade Agreement, but also the Trans Pacific
Partnership, the TPP. And he’s capturing a
sense of discontent that has been brewing
and brewing and brewing since the mid to late 1990s. And that’s a different,
you would say, demographic or ethnic
or racial population, but it’s also a very
intense level of discontent that crosses party lines. There are people who are
Democratic affiliated that feel this way,
and the Republican affiliated they feel this way. And so, stepping
back– and I think I’ll let Professor Blyth
talk more about this in terms of the realm the economy–
all of the objectives indicators for our economic
situation are good, are better than they’ve
been for a very long time, yet there is a sense among
certain very intense and very broad pockets of the
population that the country’s going in the wrong direction. So there is a gap between, some
would say, objective reality, and then there’s what
people’s perception is. But I would argue that
it’s also the experience of their daily lives. And so if you’re experience
in your daily life hasn’t gotten better,
and you feel less secure, and you feel more
resentful, that’s real. That’s not made up. So the attempt by people to say,
you should understand things are better, if it’s
not better for me, than I’m going to have a hard
time really absorbing that. So those are strains I
would argue that have been, as I said, sort of
captivated by the campaign, more so by Donald Trump
than Hillary Clinton. And that’s partly a
factor of the fact that Hillary Clinton
is a Democrat trying to be elected president
after eight years of a Democratic administration. So to some extent, you can’t
run from the same party as the person who’s occupied
the White House for eight years and say things are bad. I’ll tell you who made that
mistakee– a guy named Al Gore. In 2000, Bill Clinton, who was
President of the United States for eight years in
the Democratic Party, gave a Monday night speech. It was good. Maybe not as quite as good as
Michelle Obama’s Monday night speech this year,
but quite good. And saying, hey, we’ve
done a great job. Things are good. We’re at peace. The economy is great. Things are great. And Al Gore came
along three days later and gave a speech that said,
I know people are hurting and things aren’t that good,
and we have a lot of work to do. That speech did not
go over that well. So Hillary Clinton is in a bind. She wants to look progressive. She wants to capture the energy
of the Bernie Sanders campaign and absorb some
of that platform, but she’s bound by the
fact that if she really wants to demonstrate capacity
in the Democratic Party, she can’t really deeply
or intensely criticize the Obama administration. She can say there’s
work left to do, and that’s what she did
in her acceptance speech at the convention. We expect some of those
themes to come out in the next seven weeks. Donald Trump, on the
other hand, sort of made his way in the
nomination process with rhetoric
that’s inflammatory. And the risk for
Donald Trump, as we’ve seen with the discussion about
undocumented people living in this country, he tried
to go to the moderate middle and say, maybe I
don’t want to deport 11.5 million people who’ve
been living here, most of whom, if not all of whom, peacefully
and being contributing members of society. But the right wing of his
party or even the right wing of his particular
base within the party sort of pushed him right back
and said, you can’t do that. So he’s also bound and has
a very difficult time sort of articulating what we
know from repeated polling– now, I’ll talk about the
polling in a second– repeated polling for the last
year, two years, three years, a majority of Americans–
and that number has gone up– believe that people who are
here, undocumented people who are law abiding, working,
sending their kids to school, et cetera, et cetera,
building a life here, should not be deported. So that number was about
54% about a year ago. Now it’s 63%. Now, remember the
partisan distribution America is about, depending on
how you count it, 45% Democrat, 42% Republican give or take. That 63% number
crosses party lines. So there’s a way in which
this election is just missing real policy
agreement that exists in the American
public on a lot of things, and neither candidate can
really articulate that policy agreement without moving away
from their partisan base. So I’ll talk a little
bit about the polls. So I want to talk a little
bit in particular about partisanship, the polls,
and then what happens next. So the polls have
gone up and down. If you look at something
called, you can search Obama
Romney, or Romney and Obama depending on your
preference, 2012, and you will see
poll numbers that look almost identical
with the exception that the numbers
are a little higher. But Romney’s at
48, Obama’s at 50. Romney’s at 50, Obama’s at 48. Starting in the middle of
September to the election, they are statistically tied. That’s 2012. That’s not the year of Trump. It’s not the year of Clinton. It’s simply
partisanship in America. When we get closer
to the election, people go home to their party. It’s just the American way
that you think, oh, I’d be tempted to cross the aisle,
but no, I can’t really do that. I’m old enough
where my first vote was a lever, a physical
lever that you had to click. I grew up in New York
State, and it was a click. That’s why Rhode Island got
rid of the master lever. You guys of a certain
age have no idea what we’re talking about. But it’s actually a
physical click lever. The point is, a lot of people
still like to vote party line. And even if the Republicans
are uncomfortable with Donald Trump, I am doubtful that a vast
majority of those people who are uncomfortable– the
polling says about 15%– 35% are dissatisfied, but
15% are outright saying they won’t vote for him– will
vote for Hillary Clinton. I think when it
comes down to it, they just won’t
pull the trigger. They won’t do that. So when we look
at the polls now, this is a phenomenon
in American politics. This is partisanship. This is people coming
home to their party. What they do want
to election day, whether they get out to vote,
that’s another question. Also going forward,
the polls in 2012 turned out to be fairly
accurate moving forward. After the first debate,
Obama didn’t do that well. Romney did better. He went up. Then Obama did better. Obama went up. What we saw in
Virginia, in particular, and Florida– still
swing states– is that Obama and
Romney were 48/46, 46/48 in these two states. It ended up that Obama
won those states, one state by 47.5 or
something, and the other by 48. So essentially, they’re
within the margin of error. And the reason the polls
get better from now until November is that
they are screening what we call likely voters. So when you say you’re
registered to vote, we don’t know how
frequently you vote, how many elections you vote in. But when you say you’re likely,
at this point in the year, the next follow up question is,
did you vote in the primary? So when you get the
answer to, did you vote in the primary–
and sometimes you can test these things out by
general voter turnout by area– but nonetheless, did
you vote in the primary? Who did you vote for? Do you remember where you voted? When voters can answer those
questions properly in sequence, you have a very
strong confidence that they did already vote. And if they’ve already voted,
and they’re registered to vote, they’re going to vote again. We know that. So likely gets even
more likely to vote. So the polls that
screen for likely are going to be more accurate. And almost all the
big polls screen for likely going forward. So those polls are
probably pretty accurate. Let’s talk about turnout, and
in particular ethnic turnout, in particular Latino turnout. So in America today, 67%
of African Americans who are registered to vote vote. In 2012, 66% of whites. And 48% or 49% of
Asian Americans and 48% of Latino voters
who are eligible to vote. So in 2012, President Obama
won 71% to 74% of Latino votes, and those votes were
instrumental in Florida, for example. So now you look at 2016, and
you’ve seen a lot of coverage how Latinos are dissatisfied
like the rest of the country, that they’re worried about
Latino turnout in particular. There are 700,000 to
1 million, depending on your estimates,
new Latino voters who are eligible to vote
in 2016 beyond 2012. So even if you just have
48% turnout among Latinos, that still translates
into more Latino votes across the country. The other important
factor for those who really want to watch as
we move along, Senate races. Sometimes there are
presidential elections where there are competitive
Senate races in swing states. This year, we have a
lot of those races. And those races
can work both ways. For example, in Nevada
there’s an open seat. There’s a Latino woman who
would be the first Latino senator elected. She’s a Democrat. There’s a conservative
Republican Congressman, Joe heck, running in Nevada. Nevada has about 17% or 18%
Latino eligible, meaning of all eligible voters,
Latinos are 17% to 18% of the electorate. They are tied in the polls, and
Hillary Clinton is behind Trump essentially in Nevada. That’s a curiosity. Nevada’s a heavy union
state, a heavy Latino state, President Obama won it. Why would Nevada not be
really in Hillary’s corner? That’s a puzzle. The other reverse
puzzle is Arizona where there’s another contested
Senate race, John McCain who just turned 80, I believe,
was first elected in 1986. I’m just mentioning
that he’s 80 because we talk a lot about the age of
the presidential candidates, 68 and 70. So many senators are in
their late 70s and 80s. I mean, it’s a job, if you
want to live a long time, you should become a US senator
because they live forever. And they all look
really pretty good. So I’m just saying that
it’s nobody’s making his age an issue, nobody. He’s 80. He’s 10 years older
than Donald Trump. But he’s not running again
for commander in chief. He ran in 2008. So he’s running against a
woman a Ann Kirkpatrick, who’s a Democrat, a moderate Democrat. And in Arizona, Hillary
Clinton and Donald Trump are tied, 42 to Trump,
41 to Hillary Clinton. Arizona hasn’t voted
Democrat since 1988 in the presidential election. What’s going on in Arizona? Arizona’s a higher percentage,
21.5% of all eligible voters are Latino. So something’s going on
with the Latino voting that is more localized then I think
pundits or political scientists like to think about. It’s not just that Latinos are
vastly heterogeneous in nation of origin, but they’re also
geographically quite different. Florida Latinos worry
about things differently than Arizona Latinos. So it’s harder for
Hillary Clinton to run a unified campaign
to, quote-unquote, target Latino voters because there’s
so much geographic difference. By the way, there are a fair
amount in North Carolina as well now. So Latinos will still
be very crucial. But if that turn
out rate gets up, if Latino voting could
get 52%, 55% that gives the Democrats
the White House, and it gives the
Democrats the White House for the foreseeable future. So I would argue that is
still the untapped political powerhouse in American politics. And you may see, as
we’ve seen in Florida, there has been a noticeable
uptick in Latino voter registration in 2016
as compared with 2012. So the media is not
talking about it enough in the right ways, I think. They’re just being
monolithic about it, which I think is
not the right way to approach the impact of
Latinos in American politics today. And clearly, obviously
immigration matters to Latinos, but it matters to a lot of
racial and ethnic groups in America. So that’s where, I think,
the mechanics matter. So I’ll tell you a brief story–
I think I have time, right? I blew my time? I’ll just talk faster. I’ll do it in one minute. So it’s a Brown student. A Brown student took a semester
off to work on the campaign in the fall of 2012, and
he worked in Virginia, and he had a fairly decent
position in Virginia. He was in charge of coordinating
poll watchers and vote getters. Meaning if somebody
hadn’t voted, you would call them, go
to their house, get a van, park your big bus by a
senior citizens center and get everybody on the bus
and make sure they voted. In order to do that, you to
be a certified poll watcher. In order to do that,
you have to train. And the campaign recruits
people to do that in June, July, August. And you have to train and
then press an online button to get certified. And if you’re certified,
you have your list, which is now on a tablet–
it used to be on paper– and you can look at who’s
voted in that polling place, and you can look at
the list of people you think should be voting for
you, people who voted Democrat in the past that you
identified, and you say, oh, these 10 people haven’t voted? Let’s get on the phone
and get them out. So you check at 10:00, at 11:00,
at 12:00, 1:00, 2:00, 3:00 in the afternoon. The Romney people
didn’t get certified. They got trained,
but they forgot to submit the final
paperwork in Virginia. So what was happening
all over Virginia was that the Romney poll
watchers were getting kicked out of the polling places
because they weren’t allowed to look at who had
voted, which means they couldn’t do
targeted follow-up, which means they couldn’t get those
people who maybe hadn’t voted that might have voted
for Romney out the door. That’s a fundamental
on-the-ground campaign mistake. And if you look at the RNC,
Republican National Committee, and you look at the
Trump Organization, they simply do not have
nearly the same capacity of on-the-ground,
get-out-the-voters that the Clinton campaign has. So if Clinton wins– I
think that she’ll win. I don’t think she’ll
win by a huge margin. But if she wins, it will
be only because of that kind of campaign organization. So before I start,
I’d actually just like to ask Professor
Schiller a question, which is, in the Brexit campaign and
in prior campaigns in Europe, the pollsters are
really beginning to worry about
preference falsification, that people are systematically
misrepresenting what they’re going to do for reasons
of social opprobrium or whatever it happens to be. Do you think any of
that’s going on here? Two things– I think
that that is going on, but there’s enough,
what we call, measurement error
on both sides of it. So if you are, let’s
say, in a household where your partner is more
conservative than you, and you get a phone call
poll at your home landline, and you’re talking
about your answers in front of your partner,
you may very well say that you’re going to
vote more conservatively because your
partner’s in the room. The same thing is
true for liberals. You might have a
very liberal partner, and you’re not quite
as liberal, but you’re going to say the same thing. Oh, I’m voting the
same way my partner is. So there probably
is voter obfuscation on both sides for
Clinton and Trump. Those numbers are not quite
as stable as they should be, but I think if you
look at the measurement error on both sides,
it’s probably fairly– We saw this in Mississippi
a couple years ago in an abortion amendment, a
state constitutional abortion amendment. Women– in the polls,
it looked like it was going to pass 51
to 38 or whatever, something like that math. And in fact, it went
down 48 to 30 something. Women had out and out lied
when they got the polling call in their home. So I think that’s
a very big thing. Second, Brexit was
an enormous issue, and you’ll be
talking about that. But I think there’s a difference
between an enormous issue and a referendum
on a single issue and you’re lifelong
party affiliation and your lifelong voting habits. I think it’s harder
to break from those, and people tend to be a
little bit more consistent. There you go. All right, so I’ll get started. Now, I’m meant to do
something next week for Watson on why Trumpism is a kind
of global phenomenon, tie in Brexit and all that. So I don’t want to repeat myself
by giving the game away first. So I have to basically think
up something entirely different to say on the same topic. Never get double booked. That’s the lesson. All right, so there’s a
line that the Europeans like to see every time there’s
an American election. I’m going to basically put my
European hat on for a moment and talk like a European
about your election. So the first thing is,
it’s more important for us than it is for you. And they say this
every election, and to a certain
degree, it’s true. I think this time,
it’s not true. I think this really is
important for reasons I’ll go into at the next talk
as to why Trump is essentially a harbinger of a transformation
of political systems across the world. But that’s not for now. Let’s talk about it this way. So everyone’s freaking out about
the candidacy of Donald Trump. Well, I’m old enough to remember
that Europeans freak out every time you
have your election. So you have this guy called
Ronald Reagan that some of you at least are in love with. When I grew up,
there was a thing on the television
called “Spitting Image.” I don’t know if
you’ve ever seen this. You get on YouTube. And basically you make
foam puppet caricatures of politicians and then put
them in awkward situations. So you had Thatcher dressed
up as a Dominatrix beating her cabinet and all
that sort of stuff. It was quite risque. And when Reagan
got shot, they ran a segment for 18 months
called “The President’s Brain is Missing.” And it was about Reagan’s
brain running around America trying to hide from Reagan. We didn’t have a very
high opinion of a guy. We really didn’t. And guess what? You know, he was terrible. He was to destroy the world. There was a second Cold War. He was going to
start a nuclear war. And he didn’t. And we survived. And then you got
Bush Senior, which was kind of a boring interlude. And then there was Clinton. And everyone in Europe, yeah,
Clinton, he’s one of us. Well, not really. He ended welfare as we know. He globalized the economy. And he gave up on the
American working classes. But let’s put that to
one side for just now because I’ll talk
about that later. And then you get Bush Junior. And that was amazing. Let’s just start a giant
war in the Middle East. Let’s spank $3 trillion
of the national treasury. Let’s not raise any taxes
to compensate for it, and then just walk
away as if nothing had happened at the end of it. And we survived him. So here’s something
to think about. You might survive Trump. It might actually be possible. And let me tell you why
you might survive Trump. First one is, what is
it that he wants to do? Well, he wants to put
tariffs up on China. OK, most of our trade
is not with China. Most of our trade is with
the rest of the world. And most of the farms that
export things from China to the US are US firms. So remembering that the
president doesn’t introduce legislation, he has to
get Congress to go along with doing basically
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of the 1930s, which was a total
disaster, targeting the one country that is one of your
most, but not most important, trading partner. But nonetheless, who
supplies most of the goods that goes into the United States
the largest employer, which is? Right. So if you’re trying to help
the American working classes, how about you put a 20% tax
on everything they consume? That’s not going to
work out too well. I don’t think that’s
going to pass. So what’s the next
thing you want to do. He wants to build a wall. Right? Now, you can build a wall. And I spoke to an engineer
about this the other day. And he said actually,
he could get away with doing it because there’s
this thing called the Rio Grande. So all you need to do is
empty it to make the cement. And you can do that. I mean, it’s
physically possible. Now, let’s think
about this as sort of public spending
and infrastructure and so on and so forth. Coming out from the
Great Depression, the Great Recession, I
should say, of 2008, 2009, the Fed has been doing
all the heavy lifting just as the European
Central Bank has been doing, the Bank of England
has been doing. There’s been a stunning over
reliance on monetary policy. And its fiscal policy
has been absent. Well, why? Well, for the prior
30 years, politicians told themselves this nice
story that economists told them that markets are good
and states are bad, and states shouldn’t spend. And if politicians spend, it
always results in inflation. So the technocrats
should run the economy, and you should give
it to Greenspan because he’s a maestro, and
it turns out he’s a Muppet. But nonetheless, that’s the way
that we went with that story. So now we’ve got a
world in which we’ve got super loose monetary policy. We’ve distorted the price
of every house, every bond, every equity on
the planet, which means that people who have
houses, equities, and bonds are doing super well, and the
people who don’t have that are being told they need
to tighten their belts. There’s no money
for you anymore. Well, you can see how this is
feeding into some of the things that Trump’s picking up on. Now, at the end of the
day, both candidates have said we need to
right that balance. We need to get
more fiscal policy. We need to have
infrastructure spending. And here’s the problem that
the left has in general, in Europe as well as
in the United States, but particularly here. The left has no credibility
on fiscal policy because they’re the left. All they are is tax
and spend liberals. So it’s much harder for
them to actually do this. There’s a kind of
Nixon-goes-to-China thing here. It’s much easier for the right
to spend on infrastructure. The only problem
there is the right want to spend on the worst
type of infrastructure. They want to spend
on things that go bang so you can have a
massive military buildup. And the problem with a
massive military buildup is it’s multiplier
effect is extremely low. And while it leads to
technological advancements, which can be spun
off into products, that takes about 20 years. Side bar. This thing, six critical
technologies, five of them invented by the US taxpayer. TCP/IP, the backbone of
the internet– DARPA; Touchscreen, lodestar– US
Air Force; GPS, US Navy. There’s two others. I can’t remember them
off the top of my head. One of them’s the chipset, and
one of them’s the microphone, I think. By the way, you paid for
this with tax dollars. Where’s your equity in Apple? Didn’t happen. Funny that. We gave it to Steve,
the great creator. Anyway, oh by the
way, this is one of the things you’ll be paying
20% more on if you export it from China. So that’s kind of dumb. But anyway, what this means is
we’re going to build a wall. That’s a really stupid way
of spending public money on infrastructure. But at least it would
have a slightly bigger fiscal multiplier impact than
basically spending it on bombs. Unfortunately, they’re
unable to spend it on anything that actually
might be useful in long term and debt reducing for
people on lower incomes and credit [INAUDIBLE]. That’s not going to happen. So you might end
up with an attempt at tariffs that fails, and then
dumb infrastructure spending. All right, you’ve
survived worse. You survived Bush. Deportations. Let’s go on to the last one. So that’s the big
one, of course. He’s going to deport
11.5 million people. The last person who tried to
do that was Joseph Stalin. It’s funny how nobody makes that
comparison, but they should. But then again,
remember this one. How many people
has Obama deported? 3 million. So let’s say Donald does 5
million, does not make Donald the worst president
in human history? How far does he have to go when
Obama’s already done 3 million? With no mandate to
do so, no demand to do so, and no payback for
doing so, and yet he’s done it. Weird thing is about
the wall and also about deportation is if you
actually look at the migration statistics, which
are updated monthly, you’ll find that Mexican
immigration to the United States is now at the
same low point it was in 1961 in terms of net flows. There are more
people going back, not just because of
his deportation policy, but for other reasons,
than that are coming in. And that’s been true since 2010. So in actual fact, we’re
about to build a giant wall to protect us from
something that doesn’t exist while engaging an enormous
military buildup to fight a war which we hope
will never happen. This is called right wing
infrastructure projects. Now, let’s turn to security. This is the bit I
genuinely do worry about because there’s this
strange love fest going on between him and Putin. So you get the pictures? You’ve seen Trump supporters
wearing Putin T-shirts and Putin supporters
wearing Trump T-shirts? All very odd. And some political
scientists have really started to get into
this– Michael Tesler, who used to be with us–
and the whole notion of racial preferences in voting. There’s been very interesting
work being done on it. I’m going to get
back to that, but I wanted to mention it
just now because there’s a sort of test
you can do, a sort of social-psychological
test through surveys for authoritarian
characteristics. And this stuff was very
common in a post-war era because people were
trying to explain Nazism, and then it fell into disrepute. And then they got better survey
techniques for sampling it. And it turns out, yeah, people
who like Putin like Trump and tend to like order,
hierarchy, dominance, patriarchy. They all flow together
in the same way. Now, here’s what worries me. You’ve got a guy
who basically says, I don’t give a damn about NATO. Now, it may be
the case that NATO has passed its sell-by date. I personally think
the EU’s expansion all the way to the Ukraine,
bringing the Baltics into NATO is just writing checks
you’re not willing to cash. At the end of the
day, if you’re not willing to trade Paris for New
York in a nuclear exchange, you’re damn well not
doing it for Tallinn, so why are you pretending? You’re not going to do it. So they’ve made mistakes. And in a sense, Trump is kind
of just calling that out. And I find myself in a weird
position where I agree. So that’s discomforting. But if you basically
short NATO, you are encouraging
someone who is rather rapacious, authoritarian actor. Now, on the other side
of that balance sheet, you can look at it and say,
but the Russians basically keep their word. Here’s a strange fact
about the Russians. They sold us gas, literally gas,
us all the way through the Cold War, and through
the Berlin Blockade, the Suez Crisis, all the way
through the Cuban Crisis, through the way through
the Second Cold War. The never turned
off the taps once. When the taps were turned
off in 2011 and 2012, it was the Ukrainians turning
it off the piss off the Germans so that they could put
pressure on the Russians. So as far as they’re
concerned, we have undermined every friendly
government on their border, used democracy
promotion is a tool of foreign policy, stock F-15
fighters in countries that are half the size of Brooklyn,
New York, constructed giant radar installations to
make their defenses redundant, and you want them to be nice. Now, Putin thinks, to some
extent, that if Trump gets in, he can do the reset that Obama
promised, but never happened. He knows that Clinton is
thoroughly anti Russian, and has a foreign policy staff
that will be very anti Russian. So everything looks good, right? But what if Trump believes him? What if he thinks he has
a special relationship with this guy? What if their good buddies
and the German’s turn away and NATO starts to falter
and all that sort of stuff? And then Putin stabs
him in the back? What do you think an
authoritarian personality like Trump’s going to do with
that nice, shiny new military he’s just rebuffed? That could get very
serious very quickly. That’s one that worries me. Another one that worries me his
astonishingly cavalier attitude towards the EU. So the thing that
arguably has been keeping the peace in Europe for the
last for the past 50 years may be unraveling
because of a bridge too far, because of the euro. But let them do it themselves. They don’t need to
push from outside. And when you go to Scotland and
stand there and congratulate people in Scotland on voting
for Brexit– note to Donald, they didn’t vote for
Brexit, but don’t let facts get in the way
of a good ideology– you’re essentially signaling
to the rest of Europe that, yes, sovereignty,
yeah, responsibility, yeah, nationalism; no to
supranational governance, no to technocratic governance. And I find myself strangely,
again, in a lot of agreement with that. Not that I was in
favor of Brexit, but there’s nuances
in there, and you can push in a certain direction. So there’s support there,
and that’s actually weakening one of the
core institutions of the post-war settlement. So he’s shorting NATO,
and he’s encouraging the breakup of the EU. We don’t get a lot from
American politicians. I mean, you guys want
things to be stable. That’s the point. So this, in foreign policy, is
a giant instability generator. So I don’t see this election
mattering in the usual way. I think it’s hugely
important for the American political economy
going forward domestically. And I think the domestic
consequences may be overstated at this point even if he wins,
but the foreign policy stuff is huge. Now, in closing, let me say, as
Professor Schiller suggested, something about Brexit, apropos
what we’ll say next time. There’s a strange link here,
which made flesh literally when the flesh of Nigel Farage
showed up a Trump rally. And he’s a very similar
authoritarian, demagogic, but hilariously
funny public speaker. If you go on YouTube
and watch the stuff he said to the
European Commissioner, it’s kind of brilliant,
and basically taps into a well of
resentment that many Europeans feel, that they’re governed by
this elite that is completely unrecallable, unaccountable. They tell everyone to
slash their budgets and accept unemployment
and lower wages. But if you go to
Brussels, it seems as if the party never ends. And there’s lurid stories in
the press about how they show up just to collect their
salaries and then clock in on a Friday at 5:00
PM and clock out at 5:00 PM, and the parliament’s half
empty, and so on and so forth, much of which is actually true. And then they look that the
European Central Bank, one guy, Mario Draghi, and if
they know anything about how finance
works, they figured out he’s the only thing holding
the whole damn thing together. So Brexit’s tapping
not just sort of the post-industrial
resentment of the working class being shorted by
their own parties, which is what’s happened– the
bottom 20% have every reason to be angry– there’s
also this feeling that you’re no longer governed
by the people you even elect. And if that’s the case, we
need to, as Brexit put it, regain sovereignty. There’s a real
elective affinity, as Max Weber would have it,
between that type of logic and what Trump is saying. And this isn’t
just about Brexit. There’s a left wing
version of this. Because if you think
about it, Syriza in Greece, Corbyn
and Labor in Britain tearing itself to
shreds just now. If you have a look
at the vote share of the German Social
Democrats, another bulwark institution of the
post-war order, they got 19% in the last
election in [INAUDIBLE]. That’s their home. The center left has been
like Clinton, the hand maiden of the globalization move. And now their reaping
the cost of basically leaving behind the people that
they were meant to represent. That’s not just true here. That’s true in Britain. That’s true in Europe. And it’s becoming
a global phenomena. Now, some people will tell
you– in my last minute– and as a lot of
academic research to support this, that,
no, that’s not true. Because if you look
at the areas that are the most
economically depressed, there’s no obvious correlation. In fact, there’s no correlation
in some cases between people who voted for Brexit
and how economically deprived there were. So some areas were
deprived, some were right, et cetera, et cetera. It’s not the economics. And you can do the same
numbers in the United States. Instead, it correlates
with authoritarianism. And this is the, no,
really they’re all racist. Now, as a social scientist,
I’m willing to change my mind. I can drop the economic
explanation and say, yeah, they’re all racist. But if you do, you’ve
got a public policy problem which is monstrous. Because if what’s driving all
of this at the end of the day is a series of economic and
distributionary problems, we can fix that with
better policies. And a huge part of
the reason as to why there’s been this huge
wealth and inequality skew is bad policies. It’s not globalization. It’s domestic reasons. So we can fix that. But if it’s the case that
suddenly 15% of American voters are a lot more racist
than they used to be, what do you do with that? Do you just send them
to the naughty step? Do you them off? Do you admonish them? How does that help? I don’t know what you do with
that if that’s your conclusion. So in a weird way, my
closing and comment is this, I hope what’s driving Trump are
economic problems because we can do something about that,
and we can also do without Trump to do something about that. But if it is the case
that basically 15% of us are a bit more racist
than we used to be, I don’t know what
to do with that. Thank you. So we have about 20
minutes for questions, if anybody wants to
start the conversation. So if it is the case
that 15% of people are more racist than
they used to be, do you think that that couldn’t
be an indirect causality from policy? So the study that people are
hanging their hats on this is one by Pippa Norris
and Ronald Inglehart. And what they do is
they do very, very large European survey
data, and they found out that basically most
of the discontent doesn’t correlate with
economics and does correlate with basically not
liking immigrants. But there’s an [? endogenous ?]
problem in this one because it could be the case
that you don’t like immigrants because the economy is crappy. Or even if it’s not
crappy in your area, there’s a perception
that the economy overall is not doing well. So it could still be driving it. So this is very much
where the battle lines of social science research
on this question are being cut. I’m writing a paper just now
for a conference in Germany, and I’m using this
as my opportunity to figure this out for myself. So I have a pile of this
stuff on my desk that says, it’s all racism. And I got a pile of stuff
that says, it’s all economics. And I’m just going to
try and figure it out. So when I’m done,
ask me for the paper. I’ll give you it . That’s where I am with it. And I would just chime in to
say that you can also have, I mean, elites– Mark’s
right that if people have a basic fear
of the other, it’s hard to fix that except to make
sure that you can integrate society as much as possible so
people have direct experience rather than sort of caricatures. But also, politicians
use rhetoric. And you can argue that
the Democratic Party has sort of just relied on the fact
that the Republican Party seems so unwelcoming to so many
different racial and ethnic groups, they haven’t done
much to change things. They’ve just kind
of a relied on that. And the Republicans have been
sort of sending, I would argue, implicit messages that parallel
what Trump is saying, but not as explicitly, for
a good six years if not longer because they
are winning elections on it. They won the House back,
they won Senate 2014. It’s been electorally favorable
for them to sort of hint around the edges
about immigration, or hint around the
edges about stereotypes about particular ethnic groups. And now Trump comes
along, and he sort of says it in this way
that’s, I think, inflammatory and irresponsible,
but it’s not a new message to those people at least
in the Republican base. So I think politicians
can do something– not that they would if they
thought that they would win an election by not
doing anything– but I think politicians can
change the rhetoric too. And what could happen, let’s
say just theoretically, if Latino vote turnout
goes way up, for example, or South Asian turnout goes
up, African American turnout goes up, if, in fact,
the Democrats can show that this is America
now, Republicans, if they ever want to win a national
election again, are going to have to change
literally their tune. And they’re going to have to
not give this kind of fodder to these views. That may not change
people today, but it will change
things moving forward. And so the question
is, what kind of effect would this election have? I tend to agree
completely with Mark about the substantive
effects of this election. I don’t think it’s going to
be as different as you think it would be if Trump or Clinton
were president in terms of just actually what gets done. But I do think it
matters a great deal for the future political
party platform and rhetoric that politicians
use moving forward. Wendy, you mentioned the polls. One of the things that
I’ve been looking at a lot are the prediction
markets because they’ve been shown, with the
exception of Brexit, which was a one-off, to be more
accurate than the polls. And right now, they’re showing
Clinton’s got a two to one chance of winning this election. It’s going to be a landslide. She’s going to get over
300 electoral votes. And I see no reason
to disbelieve that. But you talked about
the dissatisfaction people have both with the
circumstances here in the US, and why they’re
voting certain ways, but also with their candidates. 30% of the people
are dissatisfied with their candidates. But what I’m
puzzled by is why we don’t see more people
rooting for the third party candidates, Johnson and Stein? If people are so
dissatisfied, why aren’t they voting for these people? Instead, they’re
being more tribal, and going to the two extremes. Well, here’s one
piece of, I think, good news about
the American voter. People constantly sometimes
stereotype the American voter as not well informed, or only
consumes partisan information now through Facebook
and Twitter and not really looking for
objective facts. But most American voters can
figure out that if you vote for a third party candidate,
that that third party cannot win the majority. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy. So your vote is wasted. And they, in fact– you talk
to anybody on the street, and they pretty much
figured that out. The evidence for that
now is the Congress. So Bernie Sanders raised
280 million dollars, 270, 280 million dollars,
and he got a good chunk of the Democrat Party. He’s been an independent
for many, many, many years. The only way he gets any
power on the Congress is to caucus with the
Democrats, but he hasn’t changed party affiliation. Same with an Angus
King in Maine. And so when you
think about that, you realize that
voters understand why Bernie Sanders
has to do that, and they understand
in a close race, they can’t afford to
go the other direction. However, in 1992 Ross
Perot got 19% of the vote. That really was a huge
cut at the Republicans. There was dissatisfaction
with George Herbert Walker Bush, Bush Senior. He had, quote-unquote,
raised taxes. He didn’t raise income
taxes, by the way, but he raised other taxes. And people decided
they were going to just– they weren’t
going to vote for him, but they couldn’t
vote for the Democrat. So a lot of them
voted for Ross Perot. He was included in the debates. So I think it may depend a
little bit on the third party candidate, but I think
in the end of the day, most voters realize that,
in a close election, that if you vote
for that third party candidate, the person
who’s closest to you, second choice could lose. What’s so ironic though
is in this state, I assume Hillary’s going
to get 80% of the votes. So any of those votes above
the 20% needed for her to win are wasted votes. Yes, but the thing
about voter information is that it’s just like sort
of a game theoretic situation. You vote, and you
think your friends and family coworkers
are all voting, and you think everything’s
going for Hillary Clinton, but you’re not certain. And because you’re
not certain, you’re not willing to take the risk. Just a note on
prediction markets. It depends on which
ones you’re looking at. None of them disaggregate
stocks and flows. And that’s a huge problem. You shouldn’t actually believe
them because the only measure stocks. So you’ve got some amount
of money on one side, and a certain amount of
money on the other side. Look, that’s the smart money. But it doesn’t
disaggregate the flow. So here’s what happens. Nine people bet $1. One guy bets $10. So you think that the money’s
telling you something. It’s not, because you don’t know
that it’s nine people putting a dollar each. So the predication markets
can be long and wrong because they don’t
disaggregate the flows. One of them now does,
the Irish market. At the back. So in talking about the
impacts domestically, we talked a lot about–
or you did mostly– about economics in politics,
and you did mention a little bit about race and racism. But I think about
domestically and even locally, the interaction among
individuals, I think, is changing. The fact that this
inflammatory speech is now becoming standardized
and the notion of getting away with political correctness. I think there is
something changing with the interactions
we have at the bank or at the grocery store,
the way that individuals are being perceived. I’ve had conversations
with people that are like, someone’s questioning my
citizenship because of the way I look, and therefore, are
putting my opinion down. And so I wonder if this
has already happened, how do we move forward? Whether Donald Trump or
Hillary Clinton are elected, this has already begun and
this has already happened. And in the next
seven weeks, we’re going to hear more about it. This inflammatory speech, I
believe, is going to increase. So what would you
have to say about how do we move on from people now
feeling like they can say all these things that they’ve
been hearing on the news, on their television sets
that they watch every day? To crib from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, I mean, the way you actually
get forward in society in terms of either combating
things that aren’t true or determining what
the society believes is to have everything
out in the open. And I think that the sad
reality of American life and American culture
is that people used to maybe think these
things, but didn’t say them. And I think some rhetoric is
inflammatory and dangerous because it incites violence. So Holmes said, you
can go to some point, but you cannot say things
that would actually physically endanger somebody else. So you can argue that
either Trump or Trump supporters have
been saying things that would endanger people. But on the other
hand, the only way to combat and to know who has
particular feelings that you would think are racist or
discriminatory is to hear them. And it’s difficult,
and it’s painful. But in some ways, it
pushes society forward because people in the
end have to take a stand. You have to decide,
which America do I want to be part of? Which America do I
want to identify with? Hillary Clinton made a
huge mistake, I think, saying “basket of
deplorables,” and we know somebody in the campaign
came up with that because, who thinks like that? I mean, have you ever thought
“basket of deplorables” in your daily life? No, of course not. Because the collective noun
is dumbbell of deplorables. Everyone knows that. Well, I’m not going that far. But I would just say that she–
so using that was a mistake, but it was designed
to fire up her base. But the point is,
she should have said, listen– she’s said
this before too– which America do you want? Which America do you
want to be part of? The America that’s trying
to work through this and go forward, or
the America that is comfortable in their
own stereotypical and discriminatory beliefs? And we’re not going to
get there if we don’t have that out in the open. I agree that it’s been
somewhat frightening to hear so much of this, and
there has been violence, and that’s very frightening. The rhetoric though
in the 1930s, for example– Professor
Blyth mentioned the Smoot-Hawley bill– if
you read– not that any of you would– if you read the
rhetoric members of Congress on the floor of the
House and Senate would say the most horrible
things about each other. You are horrible traitor. You want this– I mean,
really– not cursing, but horrible things
to each other. And so rhetoric has been
inflammatory in the past. The Red Scare. Calling somebody a
communist, depriving them of the ability to work, losing
their homes, losing their jobs, losing their ability
to earn a living. This happened for good, I would
say, minimally eight years actively in America, witch
hunts for people’s beliefs. We’ve had really scary periods
of time like this in the past. I’m actually
encouraged by the fact that we have to confront it. We have to move forward. And people can’t just sit
and have it in their own head anymore. They really have to
make a choice now. The other thing I’ve noticed
police, believe it or not, on the other side
of this difficulty is that people who are so
distressed about the rhetoric, conservative and
liberal, in some ways are trying to be a
little nicer sometimes. I think you get this
sort of reverse thing which is, what can we do to
combat this kind of language? And my simple thing is I say
good morning to people now. I mean, everybody. And I gave a talk in New
York, and the New Yorkers are like, nobody says good
morning back to you, right? But they’re wrong. Just going over to that
talk, I walked 10 minutes on Upper West Side, and I said
good morning to everybody, and everybody said
good morning back. And I think if you look
up from your phones and you say hello to people
and acknowledge their humanity no matter what they look
like or who they are, you are contributing to
bettering our climate. It’s small, but I
think it can work. So I think those are the kinds
of things your generation has to think about. How do we communicate with
each other personally, humanly rather than in so
many other ways? What if some of those
people, the downwardly mobile working class, don’t think
it’s an option for them to be part of that America,
the diverse America? They think they’re
marginalized and America is for everyone else. It’s for women and black people
and immigrants and gay people, and that’s what the political
system seems to be forwarding. And it just isn’t for them. They’re not part of it. They can’t just
decide to part of it. They have been marginalized by
economic, social, and political processes. I mean, I think I’m going
to let Professor Blyth talk a little but about this as well. But very quickly, there are
two things I would say to that. One is, I think that’s
the Democratic Party’s responsibility. I think that’s a Democratic
Party platform rhetoric. I think that the Democrats have
to work much harder to say, here is what we can do for you. For example, worker
retraining, particularly for workers over
the age of 45 or 50, active funding for
vocational education. The vast majority of
people don’t go to college. 60% of America
doesn’t go to college. What do they have when
they get out of school? They’re 18 years old. Bill Clinton cut
the funding for it. Reagan cut it. Bush cut it. Bill Clinton never
put the money back. Now all it is about college,
college, college, college. For a lot of people, that’s not
even the right temporal answer when they get out
of high school. And we have an obligation
to put policies forward that give them real
training and real options, and we don’t do it as a society. That, to me, is on
the Democratic side. That’s their flaw. And the second thing I would
say is, on the other hand, you look at evangelical
churches in all of the South. And they do all this
missionary work. And they do a ton
of work in places like Africa, and Indonesia,
and Latin America. The Mormon church does
a lot of that work. And it seems as though
that doesn’t count nobody recognizes that. And maybe they
view, quote-unquote, “the other” in
America differently, but it’s also a failure of
understanding the outreach that religion actually
does in a positive way that I think also maybe
Democrats or slash liberals don’t acknowledge. So this also goes back to
Professor Schiller’s point about this is not as important
as you think right now, but it will be in the future. So let’s bring it back to
the, is it the economic story or is it the race
politics story? And that’s why I ended
with that note, which is if you just castigate them
is racist and deplorables and you don’t do anything
to change the material conditions of their lives, then
they might become that even if they’re precisely because the
rhetorics that you’re pointing out have been– they’re there
to be appropriated and changed. So part of this has to
start with a mea culpa by the Democratic Party
that they don’t want to do. So let’s take one of the
central players, Larry Summers. Larry Summers in 1997 says that
the East Asian financial crisis is an excellent
buying opportunity for American corporates. This is the guy who does the
Commodity and Derivatives Modernization Act. It basically the
seeds the ground for synthetic derivatives
such as the financial crisis. This is a guy who
apparently blew up a third of Harvard’s endowment. I don’t find that
one at all unamusing. And he’s behind a lot of these
policies, trade policies, Clinton under NAFTA,
et cetera, et cetera. Nobody wants to own it. There hasn’t been a single
mea culpa in terms of, we might have got
something wrong here. And we see this. And this is Clinton’s
big vulnerability for me, me personally, is
the Goldman Sachs issue. So you won’t release transcripts
when you talk to finance. I talk to finance. You can all get my transcripts. I tell them what I tell you. They’re just dumb enough to pay. Now, Goldman doesn’t
want financial reform, and they could lobby and
spend a billion dollars and still get financial reform. Or you can just give
Clinton two opportunities to speak for half a million. Get her to say things that
she’s so ashamed of she won’t release the transcripts. And then you’ve bought insurance
against financial reform for half a million bucks. That’s incredibly stupid. And it’s also a sign that
the Democrats are not willing to learn and
that what the have done is to be the hand maiden of a
system which is now biting them back. Now, the first step in doing
this is that mea culpa. And I don’t see it
coming from anywhere. And what worries me is that the
race meme, they’re all racists, is the democratic
defense mechanism. And if you do that,
and you basically castigate a large chunk of
America for political reasons and because you can’t do a
mea culpa as essentially being the irredeemables, then
you seed the ground for exactly what
you’re talking about. And that, to me, is the
worry of the future. Gentlemen at the back and Rose. I guess this is just a
question for one of you, but given that one
campaign has a ground operation and the other
campaign does not, do you expect Hillary Clinton to
ourperform her national polls? That’s a great question. I think that– I’m not sure
I expect you to ourperform the national polls, but
I think that the Obama lesson of 2012 in
Virginia and Florida is a really important lesson. I expect her, because of the
ground game in some states, to be on the other side
of that margin error. In other words, even if
Trump has a two point lead North Carolina, North
Carolina’s obviously undergoing a lot of
tumult right now, so that’s going to be kind
of a new question mark. But I think where she’s
two points behind, I wouldn’t be very surprised
if she wins that state by two points more because I think
the ground game makes up that kind of margin
of difference. And I think the media
is not paying attention to it because nobody finds
it an attractive thing to think about or hear about. But I think it still
matters a great deal, and I think that’s
the untold story. And that’s what we
learned from 2012. And Romney thought– he
had internal polls that show him winning. He had consistent
polls all through– he thought he was going to
win by a couple points. Completely persuaded. But their ground
game fell apart, and that’s what cost him. And so I still think– I mean, isn’t it that no one
picks up the phone anymore so every pollster
has their own model? There’s two things
that people are saying. One is cellphones. Although, the big polls are
getting enough cellphones. Remember, millennial
turnout, those people most likely to have a cellphone not
a land line, are also only 48% of the voting electorate on
the election day– I’m sorry, only 48% turn out among
that group on election day. So whether they
swing an election, I’m less likely to incline
to believe that they swing the election in a state,
in a particular state, because nationwide. Where as Latinos are located and
concentrated in certain states, so I think they’ll swing. The one thing we have
learned is that the polling is under polling Latinos
because they’re not doing enough Spanish language polling. And I think that could
come back as something that distorts the polls in
terms of her performance on election day in
particular states. So I do think that that’s true. But the modeling–
and I always think it’s a dichotomous variable. It’s a one or zero. You win or lose, except for
2000 when it was unclear. But typically, it’s one or zero. So I don’t care if she’s
75% chance of winning or a 70% chance of winning. She either wins or she loses. Same with him. And then Rose? Yeah, this is really great. I’ve learned a lot. My question is really related
to your last point, Mark, which is, I think that there’s
a lot of discussion about race, but I really think the
implicit issue is gender. And I’m surprised that that
hasn’t been picked up more. If you take Gloria Steinem’s
argument seriously that this is really– that when
people lie in the polls, it’s because they’re
not willing to say, I don’t want to
vote for a woman, and so you’re going to
get that kind of thing. And I recently talked
to Michael Tesler about this– you were
just talking about him– and he thinks that
the margin’s going to be even more on
an issue of gender than it was for Obama with
race in the last elections. And it’s so
systematic– and I know I’m a bit of a conspiracy
person in this way– but I have to actually believe
that the emphasis on race is a conscious diversion away
from the systematic issues about gender because 50%
of the population is women. And as many minorities
as they are, they’re not 50% of the
America population as yet. They’re getting close. And if you look at
structural discrimination around the world, by far more
gender than it is racial. And so how much
of this is really about trying to put
attention in a place that people feel comfortable
being upset about rather than actually talking
about a place where people pretend that there’s
egalitarianism, but the discrimination
is every bit as bad as. So just to clarify, what’s
the equilibrium on this? I mean, what’s the strategy
of the Trump camp vis-a-vis gender, and what’s
the counter-strategy of the Democrats
vis-a-vis gender? Oh, no, I’m saying on
the Democratic side. On the Trump side,
I think that there is– he says stuff that’s
both sexist and racist and lots of other
kinds of “ists.” So the Democrats
are talking race because they don’t want to
talk gender, essentially? That’s right. Because it opens a
particular weakness. They don’t want to open
and say, maybe as a woman, she’s not such a commander and
chief, not because they believe that, but because they know that
there’s a lot of white people out there who do believe that. Wendy can talk to this. But you do see
the fact that this is a candidate who’s running
with very high negatives to start with. So some of that’s already
priced into those negatives. So I mean, we’re old enough
to remember the Clinton years. And I’d just moved to the
United States at all times, so 25 years ago,
I’d just got here. And it was astonishing to
me how this woman was hated. I mean, viscerally hated by men. It literally blew me away. I was like, she hasn’t
doesn’t anything. She hasn’t done anything,
and yet she’s Lady Macbeth. And that was her role. She was just cast as that. That generation,
some of them died. But a lot of them
are going to vote. So yeah, I think that’s there. Now, whether that’s fully priced
in in terms of the negatives, I don’t know. But, yeah, yeah. Well, but it’s such
a critical part of the authoritarian
personality. So the original authoritarian
personality, yes, it was mostly about anti-Semitism,
but the other piece was really about patriarchy. It was really not about
anti-African-Americanism. And the right wing
authoritarianism, it shifted slightly, but the
strongest factor loadings are always on patriarchy. And so we can talk a lot
about race, and it matters. And I’m not saying it doesn’t. But it’s interesting that it’s
to the neglect and– I’m not even sure what the
right word is– but it diverts a particular kind
of attention, and I’m just– I think you’re– I agree with
both of you in the sense that I think that it is priced in. I think she’s been in the
public eye for 24 years. And I think people who don’t
like her just don’t like her, and they’re a greater majority
of men that don’t like her. Now, Democrats, even
Obama in his best year got 46% of white men. So the Democrats have a
tough time with white men to begin with. However, I think in
some ways, because she’s such a known
commodity as a woman, in some ways the gender
thing is so built in, the way we’ll be able to figure
this out is after election day. Right now she’s running anywhere
from 14 to 17 points ahead among women. So Obama got 55% of the female
vote and Romney got 44%. But importantly, Obama got
African American women, and he did not get a majority
of college educated white women. African American
women turn out 70.5%. They are the highest
demographic turnout group. So if you think about
that for Clinton, what we’ll be able to see
is if college educated white women vote for Clinton. Especially Republicans. That’s what I mean. Because generally college
educated white women lean Republican. So if we see in areas that
we know that have voted– OK, exception to the rule. So we look 2012 when
we know certain suburbs in Atlanta and Philadelphia and
even around Denver or Boulder, if they voted Republican
a number of times, and then we see that
drop quite a bit and we combine that
with exit polling, we’re going to get a pretty good
idea of what women did in 2016. And to me, the resistance
against Clinton by women is the most curious
thing in this campaign, particularly in the
Democratic Party. I think a lot of the
Bernie Sanders effect was resistance against Hillary
Clinton among white men who were Democrats. And I think that this
is a big question mark. And we’re going to really
see how this plays out among women who would
not have been expected to vote for a Democrat. Do they vote for Hillary Clinton
not because she’s a woman, because she’s not Trump? And I think if we had a new
person, even Elizabeth Warren, but if we had a– or Kirsten
Gillibrand from New York State, or somebody who wasn’t
in the eye for 24 years, we could do a clean test. I just don’t know how
clean a test we can do. But I think they’re
both at play– in play. So we’re actually at one,
but we’ll take one more here. You kind of alluded
to the role of this, but I’m wondering what you
think is the effect of sort of Facebook politics in
this election and the role that social media has
not just in shaping the American people’s
political opinion, but their perspective on
other’s political opinions? Can you talk a little bit
about Brexit and Facebook in Europe, because I know
nothing about social media use in Europe. Sure, sure. Oh, you want me to do it now? Sure. Then I’ll wrap it up. So the internet and politics
tends to be the great divider. So you filter into camps. You go to the websites you
like, et cetera, et cetera. And the interesting thing about
Facebook postings apparently– and I don’t know
much about this, but I read one paper
on it– is that they found people who were
posting things on Facebook did it for two reasons. There was one which
was, look at this, it confirms that I’m pro
stay in, I’m pro remain. Here’s a piece
that’s pro remain. I’m sending it to
other pro remainers. That’s actually
kind of pointless because you’ve already
got the message. So the major impact
ones that got circulated in terms of Facebook
forwards were the, here’s the most moronic
Brexit argument yet. So you’re taking somebody
else’s opinion on board to share it so you
can ridicule it. So that’s a very odd form
of political communication when you think about
it because you’re not communicating at all. You’ve already decided
they’re Muppets. Look, I’m showing
you they’re Muppets. I’m showing all my
friends they’re Muppets. Look, I’m really popular
because I can show you how muppity these people are. So that’s not communication,
and that’s how that played out. But as to the aggregate
effect of this, what does this
actually mean, I think opinion is divided in
terms of what it really means given the fact that
your generation doesn’t vote in the numbers it should. I would say just on the
question of social media and just publicity
in general, I do think there is a shaming
effect on both sides. People are worried about
saying what they think. Some people just
go out the door, and they get a lot of
users and followers if they say really
controversial things. But a lot of other people are
shying away now and saying, I don’t want to get
pounded on the internet. I don’t want to get– I just
want to stay away from this. And this gets to your
point about what people say and they don’t say
in American society. And I’m fearful that
people will go underground. They don’t want to
be out there, and so then a lot of hidden beliefs
that we can challenge or we can’t negotiate. So that’s my concern
about the backlash you’re seeing from social
media right now, is that it’s driving people
back into their own worlds in a way in terms of
expressing their opinion, and they just go along. And that makes me
nervous because I think it’s better to
have people feeling free and safe to say what
they think rather than not. I think that holds true for
every educational or social environment that we live in. So thank you so much for coming. And we’ll see you
in a couple weeks.

34 thoughts on “Mark Blyth and Wendy Schiller ─ Election 2016: Impact At Home and Abroad

  1. Mark brought up quite an insightful question regarding polling inaccuracy during the Brexit campaign. However, I think both speakers have failed to realise that this is not a new issue with polling in the UK. Pollsters have been consistently been calling elections wrong by quite a large margin for decades. I think that it has more to do with the methodology of the pollsters than they care to admit and are using the peer pressure argument in order for their funding to be continued.
    Additionally, the UK has been going through a fundamental shift in politics for quite some time and the old party allegiances are breaking down as can be seen by the complete collapse of the Labour vote in Scotland over the past decade to the point that the Conservative Party who could hardly win a seat in the country 20 years ago are now the party of opposition to the SNP. Mark characterises this as global Trumpism which helps the Americans understand a phenomenon that is much older than the Trump campaign.

  2. With regards to whether it is an economic problem or a racism problem, I think Mark already knows the answer and I think he hints at it in this presentation. My opinion is that the racism is always there and is a natural aspect of everyone's makeup. However, economics is a multiplier and in hard times it is negative and in good times it is positive. I do not consider racism itself is not a problem that economics cannot deal with.

  3. Wendy was spot on regarding driving bad ideas underground. She has highlighted one of the problems the Youtube Heros campaign causes. If bad ideas are not in the open to be challenged because of censorship, how then can they be combated and be shown to be bad ideas?

  4. If all that dont care which party gets elected due to the discontent Wendy Schiller mentioned and if all those that tend to not vote for a candidate at all showed up and voted for a third candidate it might make a real difference even if he did not actually win because it would weaken the mandate of both parties and send a message to the law makers that there jobs are also at risk. . . . Maybe someone with better skills can make my argument for me better or tell me why it's not a valid argument. I tend to never vote Democrat but I'm tempted to vote for Sanders this time.

  5. I'm more worried about Clinton setting up no fly zone in Syria and shooting down a Russian plane which starts WW3 and we can kiss our proverbial asses goodbye, eu didn't keep peace in europe, eu's argument is that trade keeps peace but that's not true when WW1 and WW2 started between countries that were each others most important trading partners.

  6. Efforts were made to bring "Spitting Image" to the U.S. (as with "Reagan's Brain"). Americans, including so-called 'liberals', didn't like it. Americans were and are hung up on the notion that we owe obedience to our Glorious Leaders. That sums it up. Dump the notion that presidents and congressmembers are either intelligent or well-intentioned — or even decent human beings — and we might be on our way to better times.

  7. Looking at issues of gender and race is fine… but fixating on them and forgetting (or ignoring) the economics side is a sure way of alienating massive numbers of poor and working poor. THAT is my beef with identity politics. That question about gender at around 56 minute mark was really about how race talk takes away prime-time from gender (understand women) talk. So if all you care about is either gender or race, then people on the left will be divided…
    Fix the discrimination against the poor and you will see how many of the gender and race issues will be addressed. But many of those on the left who are fixated on identity politics are comfortably middle-class or higher, and who have assets that might be put in risk if they take any action against the current economic paradigm. So they don't feel comfortable with addressing these broad economic disparities.
    One more point, in this already long rant. What about the policies that identity politics has inspired? They, themselves, are often times authoritarian (e.g. policing language-if you choose the wrong gender identity pronoun, your whole point is automatically invalidated) and divisive. Anyone on the fence, anyone who can be persuaded to join the left's cause of economic equity, looks at these toxic policies and wonders: what is it in for me? And the answer is nothing.
    Identity politics, in its current form, in the current times, is a dead end for the left.

  8. I didn't like Wendy's talk as much during their election post-mortem. She said a few things that irritated me and sounded like pretty superficial analyses. This talk she really shows how knowledgeable she is though. Jealous of all these students who have access to these two.

  9. "the only way to combat racist feelings is to hear them" My concern is President Trump's ability to influence people who didn't have racist feelings before.. maybe as president, Trump (w the media's help) could persuade more people over to a more racist line of thinking.

  10. I've only learned on Mark Blyth recently.

    How the fuck does this guy have his hand on the pulse of what's going on? He called Trumpism, and he called misrepresentation through polls.

  11. And to think these people make a handsome living out of this gibberish. Interesting to note that according to Professor Blyth, unless you voted for purely economic reasons, you are a racist.

  12. If Obama had addressed inequality and poverty, you wouldn't have had poor people voting in droves for Trump.

    The poor working people are sick of the 'new' left (of SJWs and identity politicians ).

  13. The 2016 elections were a wake up call to all the limousine liberals studying politics at uni. . .

    Most of the people in the real world do not share your 'values'. They have to WORK for a living. Understand that and you will have half a chance at success.

  14. the reasons people voted for brexit are more nuanced than media and politicians think. to some extent racism was a part. so was democracy, economics, distrust of politicians, political correctness but mainly it was about unrestricted free movement from European nations driving down wages putting strains on services at a time of government austerity.arguments can be made that migration improved the amount of tax taken by government but nations don,t like change to happen quickly and in case of Britain mass immigration was unrestricted because of ineffective government

  15. Saw a few other more recent videos of Mark Blyth and decided to find a pre-election video with him to see what his opinion was then. I must say, I was not disappointed by this one. Nearly all of the points he made was spot-on and flow very well into what he says in more current lectures.

    One of the students questions about pre-election polls brought to mind something that the founder of FiveThirtyEight said on election night before the shit really hit the fan. People were castigating the site for showing the election as being much closer than they thought it should be while at the same time the NYTimes was showing Hillary as a 95%+ chance of winning (which turned out to be poor assumptions by the NYTimes on how Obama voters would vote in 2016).

    What the founder said was essentially that poll results showing chance of winning and losing are VERY different from voting results showing percentage voting for one candidate or another. If a poll shows a candidates chance of winning at, say, 80% for example, that still means that the actual vote count is very close. Literally, roll the dice, and 20% of the time the candidate on the 20% side is the winner. That's what it means. Its a first-order differential, not a vote total percentage. And in some respects, the many polls (such as the NYTimes) that showed Hillary would be the landslide winner probably had an effect on the vote turnout for her later that night.

    In anycase, I think Mark is on the money in describing the mechanisms that led to Trumps victory. He touched upon at least half a dozen major points in this pre-election lecture that turned out to be true post-election. This video deserves far more than the mere 22867 views it got… people have short-term memories and confirmation bias (only watching things you agree with, or to castigate things you don't agree with) is still a big problem.


  16. This whole debate on reason why Trump won is because of racism is asinine. It's a two way street in this election. I don't think a lot of people realize that a lot of support that was available for Obama suddenly wasn't there for Hillary. There was less total votes in the 2016 election than there were in either the 2012 and 2008 elections. The rhetoric from Trump is cringeworthy. There should be no debate about that. But he didn't win because he said awful things to people (except maybe Rosie O'Donnell, which got a roaring applause if I recall correctly). He won because 1) He's a businessman who could prove useful into building an economy, 2) Hillary's political resume isn't exactly a shining star, and 3) Lotta people wanted to flip off the system. I'm not refuting the idea that racists existed in the election. I'm saying it's a very small portion.

  17. Wendy Shiller represents the snobby elite people who may not be mega rich or be of that class but Identity with them. She uses Identity politics to justify their own bubble and their superiority. Malcom X told everyone about “liberals” in the 60s. I’m a black man and I’ve felt descrimination in my military service and in the civilian life. But these kinds of people like her do more damage and insult mines and many other people’s suffering with their gloss over nonsensical change and diversity rhetoric.

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